Thinking of doing business in South America? If so, consider this piece of advice: If you'd like your workers there by 9 a.m., tell them to arrive at 8 a.m. A new study by Andrew Horowitz, economics professor at the Sam M. Walton College of Business at the University of Arkansas, suggests national campaigns against tardiness in Peru and Ecuador won't work.
Horowitz developed a theoretical model of punctuality games to understand why people choose to be tardy, and how to change their behavior. He focused on the stage at which players, grouped in pairs, decide whether to arrive punctually based on factors such as meeting time, duration, participants, and agenda. Horowitz identified three categories of punctuality policies.
Horowitz developed a theoretical model of punctuality games to understand why people choose to be tardy, and how to change their behavior. He focused on the stage at which players, grouped in pairs, decide whether to arrive punctually based on factors such as meeting time, duration, participants, and agenda. Horowitz identified three categories of punctuality policies.
The First Category, titled "preference modification," uses non-monetary social sanctions and/or rewards to modify preferences for punctuality or tardiness.
The Second Category, "payoff manipulation," is the use of monetary penalties and/or rewards to modify behavior.
The Final Category is various mixtures of the first two. The model was set up so penalties could be levied two ways: on a tardy player if the other player is punctual, or on both players if both are tardy.
Horowitz found that fining someone for being late while his or her colleague is on time was ineffective. But large penalties on both parties of a tardy-tardy pair were potentially effective, and could even lead to punctuality. Monetary rewards were given only to the punctual person of a tardy-punctual pair, and to both parties of a punctual-punctual pair. Findings suggest monetary rewards given to the punctual player of a punctual-tardy pair are potentially effective, and monetary awards given to both players of a punctual-punctual pair are completely ineffective.
"The findings suggest that the current generation of policies hold little promise," says Horowitz, "and that resources expended in their implementation likely will have little or no tangible return."
"The findings suggest that the current generation of policies hold little promise," says Horowitz, "and that resources expended in their implementation likely will have little or no tangible return."
By Margery Weinstein
