Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Deng Xiaoping And The Transformation Of China By Ezra F. Vogel

Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China
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Perhaps no one in the twentieth century had a greater long-term impact on world history than Deng Xiaoping. And no scholar of contemporary East Asian history and culture is better qualified than Ezra Vogel to disentangle the many contradictions embodied in the life and legacy of China's boldest strategist.

Once described by Mao Zedong as a "needle inside a ball of cotton," Deng was the pragmatic yet disciplined driving force behind China's radical transformation in the late twentieth century. He confronted the damage wrought by the Cultural Revolution, dissolved Mao's cult of personality, and loosened the economic and social policies that had stunted China's growth. Obsessed with modernization and technology, Deng opened trade relations with the West, which lifted hundreds of millions of his countrymen out of poverty. Yet at the same time he answered to his authoritarian roots, most notably when he ordered the crackdown in June 1989 at Tiananmen Square.

Deng's youthful commitment to the Communist Party was cemented in Paris in the early 1920s, among a group of Chinese student-workers that also included Zhou Enlai. Deng returned home in 1927 to join the Chinese Revolution on the ground floor. In the fifty years of his tumultuous rise to power, he endured accusations, purges, and even exile before becoming China's preeminent leader from 1978 to 1989 and again in 1992. When he reached the top, Deng saw an opportunity to creatively destroy much of the economic system he had helped build for five decades as a loyal follower of Mao—and he did not hesitate.

Product Details
  • Amazon Sales Rank: #197 in Books
  • Published on: 2011-09-26
  • Original language: English
  • Number of items: 1
  • Binding: Hardcover
  • 928 pages
Editorial Reviews

Vogel offers a nuanced portrait of China's great reform leader Deng Xiaoping and a shrewd analysis of the political maneuvers by which he made such a large mark on history. By entering deeply into Deng's vision for China, Vogel shows how the person who forged the world's most successful example of modernizing authoritarianism understood how such a system could work. And he shows how a major leader can steer a huge country in a new historical direction. A terrific accomplishment.
--Andrew J. Nathan, Columbia University (20110709)

Not just a definitive biography of a world-class leader, but also the most authoritative and riveting account of the secretly contrived U.S.-Chinese strategic accommodation of 1978 and of how that in turn facilitated China's domestic transformation.
--Zbigniew Brzezinski (20110718)

A multilayered study of change and adaptability. At the core is one man's response to the dangers of a complex revolution. Around him is the transformation of the largest political entity in history from rural disarray and helplessness to an industrial and manufacturing giant. In between are ambitious and bewildered people in search of leadership. Vogel has made Deng Xiaoping's vision convincing, the Chinese maze comprehensible, and even the bit actors come alive.
--Wang Gungwu, National University of Singapore (20110909)

This is an impressive and important biography of one of the most important men of the twentieth century. Deng Xiaoping transformed China economically, politically, and socially. One of the most significant achievements for his and my country was the establishment of diplomatic relations between us. The book provides an excellent account of this historic event.
--President Jimmy Carter (20110901)

Deng Xiaoping's skill, vision, and courage in overcoming seemingly insuperable obstacles and guiding China onto the path of sustained economic development rank him with the great leaders of history. And yet, too little is known about the life and career of this extraordinary man. In this superbly researched and highly readable biography, Vogel has definitively filled this void. This fascinating book provides a host of insights into the factors that enabled Deng to triumph over repeated setbacks and lay the basis for China to regain the wealth and power that has eluded it for two centuries.
--J. Stapleton Roy, former U.S. Ambassador to China (20110901)

Deng could be tough, but he was direct and engaged. He was a person we could do business with, and I liked him a lot. He played an extraordinary role, bringing the world's largest nation into the modern world. We are fortunate that Vogel, one of our foremost China scholars, has now brought the man alive in this uniquely researched biography.
--Brent Scowcroft (20110927)

A thorough picking-over of Deng Xiaoping's record and accomplishments, setting him firmly as the linchpin linking an antiquated authoritative thinking to modern growth and acceleration...Vogel meticulously considers all facets of this complex leader for an elucidating--and quite hefty--study. (Kirkus Reviews 20111006)

[An] impressive and exhaustively researched biography...Vogel reminds readers that it was under this pragmatic politician's watch that the party made three moves that helped it outlast so many other Leninist organizations.
--Jeffrey Wasserstrom ( 20110913)

From arguably the most important scholar of East Asia, this is an important book on the force behind China's transformation in the late twentieth century, whose full fruits are visible only today. Deng ordered the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, but he was also the person most responsible for modernizing China and opening it to trade with the West. Again and again he survived threatening challenges in the Chinese political bureaucracy, to emerge at the top in the late 1970s. His role in subverting Chinese orthodoxy from the inside is comparable to that of Gorbachev with respect to the Soviet Union--and he deserves sustained attention such as this landmark book offers.
--Anis Shivani (Huffington Post 20110927)

This intensely researched doorstop delivers a step-by-step political biography of the man who gets most of the credit for China's spectacular rise to an economic juggernaut. Vogel recounts how Deng (1904–1997), a leading figure from the 1950s on, was banished when his preference for practicality over class struggle angered Mao Zedong during the disastrous 1969–1975 Cultural Revolution. Returning to power after Mao's 1976 death, he eliminated the anti-intellectualism and chaotic policy swings that characterized Mao's rule while opening the nation to Western ideas. The result was China's emergence as the world's most dynamic economy, with a free market but still with a disturbing absence of political freedom (he gives a nuanced analysis of the Tiananmen Square massacres)...Scholars will value it. (Publishers Weekly )

A masterful new history of China's reform era. It pieces together from interviews and memoirs perhaps the clearest account so far of the revolution that turned China from a totalitarian backwater led by one of the monsters of the 20th century into the power it has become today...Vogel has a monumental story to tell. His main argument is that Deng deserves a central place in the pantheon of 20th-century leaders. For he not only launched China's market-oriented economic reforms but also accomplished something that had eluded Chinese leaders for almost two centuries: the transformation of the world's oldest civilization into a modern nation...[An] illuminating book.
--John Pomfret (Washington Post )

If you want to understand China today, you must understand Deng Xiaoping (1904–97)...Deng shared Mao's ambition to make China a strong nation under party leadership, but he cannily built an unassailable position within the party to take it in new directions. Vogel interviewed dozens of leaders and China experts, as well as Deng's family, did exhaustive documentary research, and mines the scholarly literature (a good deal of it by his former students) to analyze Deng's initial success in building China's economy and international position, frustration in the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, and ultimate legacy...Massive but fascinating, this is highly recommended for those with a serious interest in modern China. Indispensable in understanding Deng, what he accomplished, and where he fell short.
--Charles W. Hayford (Library Journal )

This is the most ambitious biography of Deng Xiaoping by a western scholar so far. Drawing on numerous Chinese sources, including the Deng family, it tells the story of a man who, the author says, may have had more impact on world history than anyone else in the 20th century...This is a monumental work, carried out in the author's retirement and intended to cap a distinguished career in Asian studies. His diligent use of official papers and his privileged access to members of the Chinese Communist elite make this biography of Deng Xiaoping the most complete we are likely to have under the present ruling order.
--Michael Sheridan (Hong Kong Economic Journal )

Ezra Vogel's encyclopedic Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China is the most exhaustive English retelling of Deng's life. Vogel, an emeritus professor at Harvard, seems to have interviewed or found the memoirs of nearly every person who spoke with Deng, and has painstakingly re-created a detailed and intimate chronology of Deng's roller-coaster career.
--Joshua Kurlantzick (The Nation )

If anybody still nurtures the illusion that Deng was a closet liberal, this book will bring them back to reality. For all the changes he championed and the vicissitudes of his life, the diminutive, blunt Deng has received much less biographical attention than Mao, which makes Ezra Vogel's huge account particularly welcome. The product of 10 years of work by a leading China scholar, it is essential reading for anybody who wants to understand the evolution of China to the status it occupies today. It offers an enormous compendium of material about the lifelong Communist whose story, even more than that of Mao, reflects the dramatically varying fortunes of his nation in the 20th century...Vogel is an admiring biographer who presents a treasure trove of new information that will delight modern China scholars for years to come.
--Jonathan Fenby (Times Higher Education )

Deng led a long and remarkable life, packed with drama and global significance, one that deserves to be dissected in detail. So we must be thankful to Harvard professor Ezra Vogel for devoting a large chunk of his academic career to compiling a prodigious biography, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, the most ambitious account of the man so far. In writing this volume, Vogel has done an enormous amount of work. He appears to have absorbed the documents from every single Chinese Communist Party plenum since 1921...There have been several Deng biographies before this...but Vogel's can be regarded as the most comprehensive and informative of the lot...There's no question that Vogel has gone farther than anyone else to date in telling Deng's story. For that he is to be applauded; there is a whole hoard of valuable material here that we probably would not have gained otherwise.
--Christian Caryl (Foreign Policy )

The big picture is the key to this book. Those hoping for hidden secrets and untold stories about Deng in Vogel's book will be disappointed. Comprehensive as it is, the book is not an expose. But it does ring with authority. The Harvard professor spent most of the 10 years lining up interviews with people who had first-hand experience of Deng. In the end he spoke to dozens, if not a hundred, of people who knew something about the man...As a result, his depiction of Deng is rich, balanced and colorful. Vogel portrays a Deng who is determined, resourceful, at times uncompromising and difficult, but always pragmatic...This is where the strength of Vogel's book lies. It is all about the grand historic view. And that is fitting: out of all of Deng's amazing qualities, it is his grasp of a broad perspective and his keen sense of history that enabled him to achieve what so many had deemed impossible.
--Chow Chung-yan (South China Morning Post )

About the Author
Ezra Vogel is Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard and former Director of Harvard's Fairbank Center for East Asian Research and the Asia Center.

Customer Reviews

Most helpful customer reviews

44 of 47 people found the following review helpful.
5As Good as it Could Be
By Tiger CK
Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China is a deeply researched and finely detailed portrait of one of the most fascinating figures of the twentieth century. As Vogel demonstrates, Deng Xiaoping's life and achievements are perhaps the best window for understanding the evolution of Asian politics and society over the last thirty years. Although there are still many aspects of Deng's life and policies that this book does not tell us, it does about as good a job as possible at describing Deng's life with the resources that are available.

Vogel generally depicts Deng as a pragmatic and farsighted manager. He did not see his role as coming up with new ideas, according to Vogel, but attached the greatest need to devising and implementing a new system. Although the book spends some time covering Deng's early life and the role that he played in the CCP during the Mao Zedong years, its focus is generally where it should be--on Deng's policies during his years in power.

The book is mostly divided into four main parts. The first covers "Deng's Rise to the Top" and focuses heavily on Deng's rise within the CCP from the early days of the CCP during the 1930s through the 1970s when Deng finally took command of the party. The second section on "Creating the Deng Era" focuses heavily on Deng's foreign policy during the late 1970s. It analyzes how improving relations with Japan, the United States, and Europe along with China's more general opening helped to create the context needed for economic growth. Vogel was able to find some very interesting materials for this section from the book, especially from the Carter Library. The third main part of the book on "the Deng Era" looks in detail at how Deng governed China and how his policies led to the beginnings of the PRC's economic and industrial transformation. Through a careful analysis of Deng's papers and the comments of his underlings, Vogel points to several elements of Dengs governing style that enabled him to become a success. He spoke and acted with authority, defended the party, maintained a unified command structure and set short term policies in light of long term goals. Although Deng led what was essentially a party state, Vogel, a political scientist, seems to hint that there were many aspects of Deng's leadership style that political leaders in Western democracies might learn from. The final section on "Challenges to the Deng Era" looks at the emergence of the democratic movement in China and how Deng responded to it. Here, of course, Vogel takes us through a difficult period in Chinese history and gives an honest analysis behind the reasons that Deng's government eventually encountered democratic protests and how Deng responded to them.

Generally, this is a sympathetic biography of Deng. Vogel sees China's opening and economic transformation as good things that could not have occurred without Deng's unique style of leadership. At the same time Vogel is careful to avoid turning the book into a complete hagiography. The most controversial chapters deal with the democratic challenge, the Tiananmen protests and how Deng dealt with these events. The author tries to be balanced here. He notes that despite the tragedy that occurred at Tiananmen, China subsequently enjoyed great social stability and rapid economic growth. At the same time, however, he notes that demands for political freedom in China have still not been completely satisfied. Both of these are part of Deng's legacy.

Despite Vogel's prodigious research, however, it becomes clear in some places in this biography that he was working under limitations. The author spent many months in Beijing conducting interviews and collecting available materials. But still the vast majority of the printed materials used by the author are published material. Some of the best Chinese scholars have managed to get a limited number of archival materials through persistent efforts to work with archivists in China and Vogel draws on their work. But Vogel himself does not seem to have gotten access to many Chinese archives that cover this period. For some serious China scholars eager to learn things about Deng that are completely new this might come as a disappointment. There are certainly places where some readers might crave a more detailed account of meetings that took place and the thinking that went into certain policies on the Chinese side. Vogel often does a good job of hinting at what these might have been. But he does not always have the materials that he needs to fully make his case. Hopefully, in the future, China will continue to open up its archives and historians will be able to draw up even more detailed accounts of Deng's strategic thinking about both foreign and domestic policy.

Nevertheless, these limitations are not really Vogel's fault but are generally inherent in writing about such a recent and, in many ways, controversial topic in Chinese history. For now, this is the best biography of Deng Xiaoping that we have and it sheds a great deal of light on the transformative role played by Deng Xiaoping in the creation of modern China. It is the best biography that Vogel could have written about Deng at this time.

18 of 22 people found the following review helpful.
By Loyd E. Eskildson
'Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China' not only provides a credible summary of how China entered the modern world, but also very useful lessons in large-scale organizational change and macro-economics. Author Vogel, Harvard professor emeritus, contends that Deng Xiaoping may have had the greatest long-term impact on world history than anyone else in the 20th century. His pragmatic, driving force behind China's radical transformation lifted millions out of poverty and reshaped global politics. First, however, he had to address the damage done by the Cultural Revolution (CR), end the Mao personality cult with its emphasis on mass mobilizations, class warfare, ideology, intensive collectivization, and central planning, revive agriculture (grain production/person when Deng too over in 1978 was less than that in 1957), and undo the economic system (price and wage controls, central planning) he had helped build. There was also a widespread problem of unqualified military officials and rebels having assumed leadership functions during the Cultural Revolution, factories that still operated did so with 1950s Soviet technology that was in disrepair, universities having essentially been closed for a decade, and no jobs for the educated youth that had been sent out to the countryside during the CR.

Deng's transformation focused not on holding Mao responsible, but the economic and political system that had tried to reach down to exert control at both the household and small enterprise levels. Deng opened China to science, technology, management systems, and ideas from anywhere. He also realized that China's economic problems could not be solved simply by opening markets - institutions had to be built gradually. He saw his job not as coming up with new operational ideas, but devising and implementing a new system, along with selecting a core of co-workers. He also had to provide hope without raising unrealistic expectations, and pace change so as not to split the nation - all while maintaining stability in employment. Deng's credibility was built on the poise of having been a former high-ranking wartime leader (12 years) and Long March survivor, spending half a century near the center of power (Deng was 74 when he became head of China in 1978), and previously leading initial performance improvements in China's railroad, coal, and steel industries. Amazingly, Deng also had been purged three times by Mao - once for eight years, and the last time shortly before Mao's death.

Mao made Deng Vice-Premier in 1975 when China was still recovering from the Cultural Revolution (CR). During that period young people had been mobilized to attack high-level officials and push them aside, plunging the nation into chaos. One of Deng's first moves was to tell the PLA to end internal struggles between CR supporters and opponents and instead focus on their assignments - those that failed to do so would be replaced. Deng also brought back many of the 25,000 former officers 'wrongly accused' in the CR. Deng also downsized the military by 20% to help pay for weapons upgrades, and helped those displaced to find new jobs; he kept all those in the Air Force, Navy, and the Army's technical experts, and resumed training activities. Deng also was careful to obtain Mao's approval for all his major actions. Deng then took on the railroads - they had offended Mao by delaying one of his trips by a week, and were also creating delay problems throughout the economy. Deng focused first on the worst railroad group in terms of accidents and delays, again went through the warning on factionalism, arrested the most cantankerous leaders, improved worker living conditions, made clear that neither position nor seniority would protect against adverse actions for failure to perform, brought in PLA troops to enforce compliance, and canceled CR verdicts on some 6,000 former workers/managers. Performance doubled. Then it was on to coal, China's primary source of energy. Coal had piled up because of poor rail transportation and miners had quit digging. After coal came steel - performance did not meet targets, but did improve about 10%. (After Deng's 1978 visit to Japan, during which he saw their much more modern equipment and methods, he never again relied on exhortation to improve performance - instead, the emphasis was on technology and methods.)

Deng also moved to select for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership those who could contribute, and replace those who got there for participating in the CR. He required members have 10+ years experience, and also removed military personnel from civilian positions. Deng continued to emphasize logical arguments acceptable to Mao, checked everything major with Mao before implementation, including revisions suggested by Mao. He continued Zhou En-Lai's 1963 'Four Modernizations' (agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology) that essentially equated to economic self-reliance by the early 21st century. Foreign technology was sought out, incentives given workers (performance, difficulty, hazardousness), propaganda personnel were removed from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, universities re-opened (the few that were open had switched to admission via nomination instead of examination; achievement again became the criterion; at the time, China's Peking University had been judged about the equivalent of a U.S. junior college).

However, in January 1976 Deng was purged again (replaced by Hua Guofeng) after the Gang of Four and Mao's nephew played on Mao's insecurities (eg. Kruschev had publicly downgraded Stalin after the latter's death, and Mao was near death himself) - Deng knew he could have avoided being purged if he'd just publicly stated that he supported Mao's CR, but Deng refused to do so. The 'good news' is that after Mao's death months afterward, the new Premier, with strong support from top leaders, had Jiang Qing (Mao's last wife) and the rest of the 'Gang of Four' arrested (they had antagonized most everyone), along with their 30 most loyal followers and put on trial. This precluded factional stalemate at the top leadership level, and unwittingly helped set the stage for Deng's return.

Hua supported opening China to the West, a reduced role for ideology, and more emphasis on modernization than class struggle. However, he had little experience in Beijing, none in foreign affairs, and little in military affairs. He also didn't support the scale of return of senior officials under Deng. Deng, for his part, accepted Hua's new role, and was allowed to champion the modernization of science, which he saw as key to to modernizing the other three. Deng quickly ended the practice of having high-school graduates do two years of physical labor before attending college - "the students (forget) half of what they learned in school." He also immediately revived the use of entrance exams for college - there were spaces for only 5.8% of those that took the test. Examinations were later expanded to also select for top elementary and high schools. Worker propaganda teams and troops quartered at universities (a CR leftover) were removed to remove them as a source of conflict. Professors' physical labor and political education requires were lowered to one-day/week. Deng used Chinese-American scientists for guidance on how to improve. The Central Party School was also reopened in 1977, and began allowing more open discussions than previously.

Deng returned to the top position in 1978, and began encouraging CCP leaders to visit other nations to increase their awareness of how far behind China was, and thereby their receptivity to changes in thinking. Yugoslavia was included because it had improved while maintaining socialism, lessening the potential perceived threats by party hardliners. Deng visited Hong Kong, and when informed of the large numbers of Chinese escaping to Hong Kong, directed a focus on improving China's economy rather than a stronger fence - this led to China's first Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Returning 'tourists' decided to begin my improving China's textiles and apparel industries. Deng set the background, stating "If we can't grow faster than the capitalist countries then we can't show the superiority of our system." Criticism of the Gang of Four was stopped to allow focus on increasing production. Deng also noted that 'some would get rich first' - they should then help others. He also pointed out that moral appeals for initiative (Mao's approach) only lasted a short time - they needed to provide rewards and promotions as well. His fellow CCP leaders were worried about repeating mistakes such as Mao's Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolutions - thus, they were slow to change Deng's titles to reflect his new position.

Deng himself also visited Japan and the U.S. His Chinese media entourage helped ameliorate negative attitudes towards Japan and the U.S., and spread awareness of China's backwardness. Deng personally worked to create a foundation for partnerships and learning. Japan and the U.S. were particularly receptive to China, seeing the opportunity to draw it away from the Soviets. Deng helped minimize opposition to change in China by using the term 'management' instead of 'Western ways,' and constantly committing to socialism and the CCP. He viewed the U.S. separation of powers as a terribly inefficient way to run China. Normalizing relations with U.S. was made more difficult because of their 'one China' policy vs. Taiwan. Secretary Vance helped Deng over this bump by suggesting that, over time, Americans would come to agree with the 'one China' perspective.

Deng conducted most of his work transforming China at home, beginning the day reading reports and newspapers, then often meeting with people in the afternoon. He attended few meetings, preferring instead to either send his assistant or rely on written comments previously made to those leading the meetings; this was partly due to his being hard of hearing, partly due his age, and probably also a better use of his time. Prior to giving major speeches, Deng cleared them with other top CCP officials, especially those involving economics. Mao's 'management secrets' started with maintaining respect for the CCP by reining in criticisms of the past or present (both within the CCP, and of its leaders), building public support before promoting path-breaking policies, avoiding taking the blame - subordinates were expected to do this, not having to face short-term elections, focusing criticisms on implementation as much as possible instead of policy, avoiding separation of powers (eg. U.S. - Congress, President, Supreme Court), pushing out those committed to old ways (mostly via mandatory retirement, enticed via providing housing and recreation centers), using think tanks and experimental trials (eg. 'let's see how it goes' vs. workers released from farm work joining small firms that sometimes exceeded Marx's admonition over having more than 7 employees; creating 'Special Economic Zones' - SEZs) instead of starting with risky mass changes, being careful to get accurate information (trusted sources, outside experts) - avoiding problems during the 'Great Leap Forward' caused by officials unwilling to tell Mao of problems, taking small steps, using aphorisms to explain complex/contentious issues (eg. not caring whether a cat was black or white, as long as it caught mice; some people will get rich first; crossing the river by feeling the stones), maintaining reasonable expectations, sensitivity to those wanting to repeat adverse historical experiences, presenting his policy as a sound middle course (eg. 'starving peasants [in 1979] should be allowed to find a way to survive' vs. those wanting continued collectivization of agriculture), deferring some troublesome problems until later (eg. Taiwan) for 'smarter generations,' temporarily backing off from change when problems/strong opposition occurred, and soliciting/accepting economic advice - an area he was not that familiar with. In addition, he never wavered in clearly preserving socialism - first by maintaining public ownership of land, precluding capitalists from dominating politics, beginning with a large economic role for 'state-owned enterprises' (SOEs) in key industry areas, and assuring that Chinese firms would not be displaced by foreign businesses as they had in the 1930s. Finally, Deng emphasized results - TV was just coming to China and its populace became quite impressed seeing SEZ skyscrapers. (Deng thought Gorbachev made a major error by setting out to change the political system first - this maximized opposition while providing little/nothing in improvements; actually, Russia's initial foray into overhauling systems was a disaster because it was unable to handle the results of immediate, massive change).

Mao had moved much of China's industrial base inland out of fear of invasion - Deng returned production to coastal areas with their improved access to shipping and better infrastructure. Another early, major change came when Deng learned that thousands had been imprisoned for trying to escape into Hong Kong. Deng's response was to stop trying to 'build a better fence,' but instead improve their economic opportunities. This led to talks and agreement to establish the first SEZ across from Hong Kong, with relaxed regulations; the first project involved a native Chinese entrepreneur who had moved to Hong Kong, yet was a member of the Communist Party, and whose project (scrapping unwanted Chinese ships for their steel) did not require much investment. Other projects soon followed - the timing was perfect because Hong Kong was running out of labor. Three other SEZs soon followed. Early lessons learned by government officials were that businesses preferred 'one-stop decision-centers' to obtain permits, arrange infrastructure, etc., areas where officials kept their promises, and labor, fees, etc. charges were kept reasonable. By 1984, the four SEZs became 18, Taiwan dropped its ban on doing business with the mainland and its businesses became major investors in China, and one SEZ even eliminated set prices on many foods (prices rose, then fell back after supply increased).

Peasant income roughly doubled between 1978 - 1982, thanks to household contracting replacing collectivization, reduced taxes, a 20% increase in prices paid for their products, and the doubling of fertilizer availability. The small commune workshops and stores that had been part of collectivization became 'Town/Village Enterprises' (TVEs) owned by local governments, but no longer bound by the former commune's former area. TVEs went from 28.3 million workers in 1978 to 105.8 million in 1992; their advantage over SOEs was not having to provide housing, health care, or schooling. Unemployment resulting from improved agricultural productivity/no longer requiring students to gain humility from working the earth also spread to urban centers, the violation of Marx's caveat on 'large' firms, and another unplanned experiment that helped Deng's cause. (The 1987 Party Congress then officially made these 'larger' firms legal - potentially highly contentious debate was side-stepped, both by the experiment and Deng's duck aphorism wondering why a farmer was a socialist with three ducks, but then became a capitalist with four.)

Deng set and pursued a goal of increasing year 2000 GDP to a level 4X its 1984 level; the more cautious leaders objected, and he ignored them - though he also asked the World Bank for an opinion on its feasibility. The Soviet Union and Mao both had sent few students abroad, worrying about a 'brain drain' - Deng did not, and very quickly had tens of thousands of Chinese students abroad. McNamara and others convinced Deng that the World Bank didn't work for the U.S., and Deng eagerly accepted its help - beginning with arranging training for Chinese economists. Visiting East European economists convinced the Chinese to not try dramatic all at once restructuring, and suggested using 'dual-pricing' (production over quota could be priced at market) as a transitional tactic. Japan was another major learning source, thanks to its transition from a tightly managed post-war economy to free-markets.

Deng's stocked soared further when he negotiated a peaceful return of Hong Kong in 1984; he also shifted his definition of 'socialism' to 'public ownership' instead of central planning, and emphasized common prosperity instead of egalitarianism. Deng, however, made a major miscalculation in 1988 by freeing many prices in an effort to avoid corruption by those taking advantage of the dual prices - inflation soared to 26% because the production couldn't meet new demand, he was forced to reverse the decision, the ground was set for Tiananmen in 1989, transformation slowed, and Deng lost face vs. his much more cautious counterparts.

5 of 7 people found the following review helpful.
5Excellent biography of Deng
By Mr. Leong Wai Hong
Deng was a giant of a man. Not in size but in stature. He was the man who ensured China grew to be a economic power house within 20 years after his death. What is remarkable is that he only became paramount leader after he was released from exile imposed during the Cultural Revolution. So he started ruling China at the ripe age of 73.

This just released 700 page biography is a very readable book. It is written in a chronological manner. Not much is known of Deng's life as his modus operandi is not to leave notes but to commit all records to memory. This was his means to stay alive.

I highly recommend this book as the previous biography by Richard Evans was published way back in 1994.


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